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Voters' Information in Judicial




In the past quarter century, an increasing number of states
have adopted the Missouri Plan (or "merit selection") as a system
for selection of judges.' Most often, the Missouri Plan has replaced
* Professor of Political Science, Ohio State University; B.A., San Fransico State
College, 1969; M.A., University of Wisconsin, 1970; Ph.D., University of Wisconsin, 1973.
I am grateful to the Poimetrics Laboratory of the Department of Political Science at Ohio
State University for providing and aiding in the use of the data analyzed in this article;
Aage Clausen and Karima Nagi were particularly helpful. The article benefited from the
comments of Bradley Canon on an earlier draft.
I In its "pure" form, the Missouri Plan has three stages. In the first stage a
commission nominates candidates, typically three to five in number, for a judgeship. Most
commonly, about half the commissioners are lawyers selected by the organized bar and
half are laypersons selected by the governor; sometimes a judge serves as presiding member.
In the second stage the governor selects a judge from the nominees presented by the
commission. In the final stage, retention elections are held after the judge takes the bench
and at regular intervals thereafter; in these elections the voters vote for or against retention
of the judge in office. Typically, a simple majority is required for retention. On the
operation of the Missouri Plan, see R. WATSON & R. DOwNING, TH PoITnIcs oF TIM
BENCH AND THE BAR: JUDIcIAL SELECTION UNDR THE MissouRi NoNPARnsAN COURT PLAN
(1969); A. Asn&AN & J. Aixn i, Tim KEY To JUDICIAL MERIT SELECTION: THE NOmNATING
PROCESS (1974); S. CARBON & L. BmucsoN, JuDcrAL RETENTION ELECTIONS IN THE UNITED
STATES (1980); Glick, The Promise and the Performance of the Missouri Plan: Judicial
Selection in the Fifty States, 32 U. MmIi L. Rnv. 509 (1978); Hall & Aspin, What Twenty
Years of Judicial Retention Elections Have Told Us, 70 JUDICATURE 340 (1987).
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 77
elective systems, which thereby have lost some of their numerical
dominance in the states. 2
This shift to the Missouri Plan has resulted largely from the
efforts of reform-minded people in the legal community who view
election as a highly flawed method for selecting judges.3 Their
opposition to judicial elections has produced a long-running debate
over the desirability of elective systems in comparison with the
Missouri Plan.4 To a great extent, the issues in this debate rest on
value questions that are not subject to empirical testing. But some
issues, such as the qualifications of judges selected under differing
systems,5 are potentially testable.
One empirical issue in the debate concerns the behavior of
2 The current distribution of formal elective systems for the selection of state judges
is shown in Cotmcm OF STATE GovERumlrENTs, Booic OF THE STATES 163-65 (1988-89). See
also M. ComisKy & P. PATrERSON, THE JUDICIARY-SELECTION, COMPENSATION, ETHICS,
AND Discn'aNE 3-18 (1987).
Elective systems take multiple forms. The primary distinction is between states that
elect judges through partisan primaries and a general election ballot with the candidates
labelled by party, and those that use nonpartisan primaries and general elections. (As noted
in the text, Ohio uses a hybrid system that combines partisan primaries with a nonpartisan
general election ballot.) On the operation of elective systems for judgeships in practice, see
P. Duois, FRoM BALLOT TO BENCH: JUDIcl. ELECTIONS AND THE QUEST FOR ACCOUNT-
ArL-rry (1980) [hereinafter Duaois, FROM BALLOT To BENCH]; Barber, Ohio Judicial Elec-
tions-Nonpartisan Premises with Partisan Results, 32 OIo ST. L.J. 762 (1971); Baum,
Explaining the Vote in Judicial Elections: The 1984 Ohio Supreme Court Elections, 40 W.
POL. Q. 361 (1987); Dubois, Voting Cues in Nonpartisan Trial Court Elections: A Multi-
variate Assessment, 18 L. & Soc'y REv. 395 (1984) [hereinafter Dubois, Voting Cues];
Hannah, Competition in Michigan's Judicial Elections: Democratic Ideals vs. Judicial
Realities, 24 WAYNE L. REv. 1267 (1978); Henderson & Sinclair, The Selection of Judges
in Texas, 5 Hous. L. REv. 430 (1968); Ladinsky & Silver, Popular Democracy and Judicial
Independence: Electorate and Elite Reactions to Two Wisconsin Supreme Court Elections,
1967 Wis. L. REv. 128 (1967); Lovrich & Sheldon, Voters in Contested, Nonpartisan
Judicial Elections: A Responsible Electorate Or a Problematic Public?, 36 W. POL. Q. 241
(1983); Squire & Smith, The Effect of Partisan Information on Voters in Nonpartisan
Elections, 50 J. PoLTIrcs 169 (1988); Volcansek, An Exploration of the Judicial Election
Process, 34 W. POL. Q. 572 (1981).
3 On the origins and development of the Missouri Plan, see Winters, The Merit
Plan for Judicial Selection and Tenure-Its Historical Development, 7 DuQ. L. REv. 61
(1968).
, This debate is summarized in DuBois, FROM BALLOT TO BENCH, supra note 2, at
1-35.
5 See Glick & Emmert, Selection Systems and Judicial Characteristics: The Recruit-
ment of State Supreme Court Judges, 70 JUDICATURE 228 (1987); Canon, The Impact of
Formal Selection Processes on the Characteristics of Judges-Reconsidered, 6 L. & Soc'y
REV. 479 (1972).
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voters in judicial elections. Advocates of the Missouri Plan argue
that voters typically choose among judicial candidates on the basis
of very limited information, so that their choices cannot be viewed
as meaningful. 6 The implication, whether stated or not, is that the
members of commissions who select nominees for judgeships under
the Missouri Plan stand in a far better position to make intelligent
choices. 7
Missouri Plan supporters can point to empirical evidence for
this conclusion. Most studies of voters in judicial elections indicate
that high proportions of voters know little about the candidates
from whom they chooseA But not all of the evidence about the
electorate in judicial contests is so negative.9 In any case, chiefly
6 See S. CARBON & L. BERKSON, supra note 1.
7 Klots, The Selection of Judges and the Short Ballot, 38 J. AM. JUDicATuRE Soc'y
134 (1955); Spaeth, Reflections on a Judicial Campaign, 60 JUDiCATURE 10 (1976). This
view is summarized in P. Dunsois, FRoM BALLOT TO BENCH, supra note 2, at 31-33; Warden,
The Bench and the Ballot: The Case for Merit Selection, 8 SrTuDNT LAWYER 32 (1979).
Of course, the general electorate plays a role in the Missouri Plan by voting for or
against sitting judges in retention elections. Thus, voter information is an issue in evaluation
of the Missouri Plan as well as elective systems. This is particularly true because voters
generally are likely to be less informed in retention elections-where information may be
especially scarce-than in contested races for judgeships. However, it appears that most
supporters of the Missouri Plan view retention elections as the least important stage of
that system. They see retention elections more as a compromise with those who feel that
voters should play some role in choosing judges than as an integral decision-making point
in the process. There is some evidence that advocates for the Missouri Plan expected the
great majority of judges to win retention in routine fashion, and in fact that has been the
case. See Carbon, Judicial Retention Elections: Are They Serving Their Intended Purpose?,
64 JuDicAa'o 210 (1980). On the behavior of voters in Missouri Plan retention elections,
see Griffin & Horan, Patterns of Voting Behavior in Judicial Retention Elections for
Supreme Court Justices in Wyoming, 67 JuDICATURE 68 (1983).
The defeat of three California Supreme Court justices in a retention election in 1986
(though not under a Missouri Plan system) followed a campaign that included most of the
features of judicial elections which disturb supporters of the Missouri Plan. See Culver &
Wold, Rose Bird and the Politics of Judicial Accountability in California, 70 JUDICATURE
81 (1986); Wold & Culver, The Defeat of the California Justices: The Campaign, the
Electorate, and the Issue of Judicial Accountability, 70 JUDiCATURE 348 (1987). The course
of the 1986 campaign in California was unique in the history of retention elections for
judges, and even approximations of that campaign are likely to remain rare. But the
average proportion of negative votes in retention elections has increased since the 1960s,
apparently as a result of more negative feelings toward political leaders. Hall & Aspin,
supra note 1, at 344.
1 Johnson, Schaefer, & McKnight, The Salence of Judicial Candidates and Elec-
tions, 49 Soc. ScI. Q. 371 (1978); Ladinsky & Silver, supra note 2, at 161, 164; How
Much Do Voters Know or Care About Judicial Candidates?, 38 JuoicAruRE 141 (1955).
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because of the rarity of survey research on judicial races, the
existing evidence on voters in judicial contests-including the in-
formational bases for their decisions-is fairly limited. For that
reason, this issue should be regarded as an open one.
This article explores this issue further. In 1986, Ohio voters
elected three justices of the state supreme court in contested races.
Responses to questions in a three-wave election survey provide
data on several matters related to the information that voters
obtained and assimilated prior to the election. An examination of
these data may provide a better indication of what voters in
judicial contests know when they make their choices.
I. TiHI INFORMATION IssUE
The issue of voter information is more complex than it some-
times is portrayed in debates about the election of judges. Several
of these complexities require consideration.
The first complexity concerns the kinds of information that
are considered relevant to an informed choice. Many people in
the legal community, including supporters of the Missouri Plan,
see only a narrow range of information as relevant to voters'
choices among candidates for judgeships.10 In their view, such
seemingly useful information as candidates' party affiliations and
issue positions is not appropriate to use as a basis for choices in
judicial races. Rather, those who choose judges need to know
about such "objective" matters as the legal expertise and "judicial
temperament" of candidates. In contrast, some political scientists,
who start from quite different premises about courts and judges,
view party and issue-related information as highly relevant to the
intelligent selection of judicial candidates." Conclusions about how
well voters are informed depend, in part, on which conception of
relevant information one accepts.
9 See Baum, supra note 2. Somewhat mixed findings on this issue emerge from a
set of studies reported in Lovrich & Sheldon, supra note 2; Sheldon & Lovrich, Knowledge
and Judicial Voting: The Oregon and Washington Experience, 67 JUDIcATURE 234 (1983).
These studies, based on surveys in Oregon and Washington, found moderately low rec-
ognition of the names of candidates for judgeships but also found that more knowledgable
respondents were considerably more likely to vote in the judicial contests than less informed
respondents.
10 Spaeth, supra note 7.
" DuBois, FROM BALLOT To BENCH, supra note 2, at 244-46.
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A second complexity concerns the availability of information.
What voters know depends largely on the amount and kinds of
information that they can obtain with a reasonable effort. Except
for the highest offices, the mass media generally supply only a
limited volume of information about electoral contests. Moreover,
candidates for offices below the highest level usually lack the
resources needed to compensate for limited media attention. Cer-
tainly both conditions exist in the great majority of elections to
judgeships. Further, judicial ethics largely prohibit judicial candi-
dates from giving to voters information about their issue positions,
a kind of information that some would regard as the most useful. 12
The limited supply of information to voters is relevant to our
assessments of voters and our prescriptions about elections. Sup-
porters of the Missouri Plan frequently chide the voters for their
ignorance of judicial candidates. Yet, such ignorance is virtually
impossible for voters to overcome without special sources of in-
formation that are very difficult for most people to obtain. Ar-
guably, improvements in the availability of information to voters
could substantially increase their knowledge about candidates for
judgeships. Accordingly, one who is dissatisfied with the quality
of judgments made by voters might advocate efforts to provide
more information to voters rather than an abolition of judicial
elections. Further, one's conclusions about the desirability of abol-
ishing elections may depend on perceptions of the likelihood that
such improvements could be achieved.
A final complexity concerns our standards for assessing voter
information. How much should voters know in order for their
judgments about judicial candidates to be regarded as well in-
formed? Those who are sympathetic to judicial elections on nor-
mative grounds might argue for a relatively lenient standard. In
light of the limited information available to the electorate and the
limited interest of most people in government and politics, one
could take the position that voters need only know enough to
distinguish between the candidates and to make their choices on
a reasonable basis.
One who supports this argument could point to the candidates'
party affiliations as a sufficient basis for meaningful decisions.
12 See, e.g., CODE OF JUDICiAi CoNDucT Canon 7(B)(1)(c) (1982).
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Particularly at the appellate level, studies have shown that Dem-
ocratic and Republican judges tend to differ along ideological lines
in their decisional behavior.13 If one starts with the premise that
it is appropriate to choose among judicial candidates on the basis
of policy positions that they are expected to take on the bench,
then voters who base their decisions on the party affiliation of
each candidate could be viewed as making intelligent choices.
Most advocates of the Missouri Plan, who hold different
normative premises about the desirability of judicial elections,
undoubtedly would demand a much higher standard. One could
argue that a meaningful judgment requires voters to possess sub-
stantial information about the qualifications of the candidates-
the kinds of information that members of Missouri Plan nomi-
nating commissions could be expected to consider. Obviously, in
most judicial contests few voters could meet this standard.
Because of these complexities, any findings regarding voters'
knowledge about judicial contests are susceptible to widely dif-
fering interpretations. Further, there are great difficulties in-
volved in measuring voters' information. Thus survey data cannot
be used to make a definitive assessment of voters' qualifications
to select judges.
Yet such data can be used to provide a better sense of the
information that voters bring to their choices in judicial con-
tests. 14 Survey responses are particularly well suited to compar-
ative analyses. A comparison of different judicial contests can
lead to a sense of the conditions that help to determine voters'
levels of information. One benefit of such comparisons is that
See R. CARP & C. RowLAND, POLICYMAKING AND Pouncs IN ma FEDERAL
DIsnucT Couars (1983), at ch. 2; Goldman, Voting Behavior on the United States Courts
of Appeals Revisited, 69 AM. Pot. Sci. REv. 491 (1975); Tate, Personal Attribute Models
of the Voting Behavior of U.S. Supreme Court Justices: Liberalism in Civil Liberties and
Economics Decisions, 1946-1978, 75 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 355 (1981).
" A number of studies have investigated voters' possession and use of information
in election contests for a variety of offices. See Converse, Information Flow and the
Stability of Partisan Attitudes, 26 Pus. OPINION Q. 578 (1962); Hinckley, Hofstetter &
Kessel, Information and the Vote: A Comparative Election Study, 2 AM. Pot. Q. 131
(1974); Macaluso, Political Information, Party Identification and Voting Defection, 41
Pus. OPmION Q. 255 (1977); Shaffer, Voting in Four Elective Offices: A Comparative
Analysis, 10 AM. POL. Q. 255 (1977); Squire & Smith, supra note 2; Baum, Information
and Party Voting in "Semipartisan" Judicial Elections, 9 Pot. BEHAv. 62 (1987).
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they may suggest steps by which voters' knowledge about judicial
candidates can be enhanced.
A comparison between judicial contests and those for other
offices can also prove useful. For example, how do voters'
information levels in state supreme court races compare with
their knowledge about races for non-judicial state offices? Such
comparisons can provide a firmer basis for conclusions about
the flow of information to voters in judicial contests and about
their assimilation of that information.
For state supreme court contests, one appropriate compari-
son is with the most visible electoral contests-those for presi-
dent, governor, and senator. Because of the tremendous
differences in media coverage and in the ability of candidates to
convey their messages to voters, it seems certain that the voters
will know significantly more about the candidates for high-level,
non-judicial offices than about supreme court candidates. Yet it
will be useful to gauge the breadth of this gap, to use contests
for the highest-level non-judicial offices as a benchmark with
which to compare voters' knowledge about judicial contests.
However, comparisons between contests for judgeships and
contests for non-judicial offices below the top level are probably
more meaningful. Although they receive far more scholarly atten-
tion than other electoral contests, races for president, governor,
and senator (and to a lesser extent for the United States House
of Representatives) are exceptions to the rule in American elec-
tions. In elections for non-judicial offices below the top level,
voters make choices for large numbers of state and local offices;
in these races the volume of available information usually is far
more limited than information about candidates vying for the
three or four most visible offices. 5 These "non-exceptional" elec-
toral contests are more comparable with judicial elections than
are contests for high-level offices such as president and governor.
This article examines in comparative terms voters' knowledge
" Regarding voters' decisions in contests for lower offices, see Byrne & Pueschel,
But Who Should I Vote for For County Coroner?, 36 J. PoLmcs 778 (1974); Nakanishi,
Cooper, & Kassarjian, Voting for a Candidate Under Conditions of Minimal Information,
I J. CONSUMER REs. 36, 37 (1974); Welch & Bledsoe, The Partisan Consequences of
Nonpartisan Elections and the Changing Nature of Urban Politics, 30 AM. J. OF POL. Sc.
128 (1986); Mueller, Choosing Among 133 Candidates, 34 PuB. OPmON Q. 394 (1970).
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
in contests for judgeships. It probes what the electorate knew
about the candidates in three rather different contests for the
Ohio Supreme Court by comparing these three races with each
other and with three non-judicial contests: two for high-level
offices (governor and,,U.S. senator), the third for a lower-level,
less visible office (state treasurer). For reasons discussed above,
these comparisons hardly can resolve debates over the ability of
voters to choose meaningfully between candidates for judgeships,
but the findings will provide additional data to inform those
debates-and, more generally, to aid in the understanding of
judicial elections.
II. Tim CONTEXT, THE CONTESTS, AND THE SURVEY
Ohio has a seven-member supreme court.' 6 The justices are
elected statewide for six-year terms in an unusual hybrid system
that combines a partisan primary election with a nonpartisan
general election. 17 In this system, competing candidates in the
general election are ordinarily from opposing political parties,
but the general election ballot does not disclose their affiliations.
In practice, however, there has been a strong partisan tinge to
supreme court contests, with each party organization promoting
its own candidate and some candidates linking themselves to
their political parties.',
Traditionally, the Ohio Supreme Court was Republican, con-
servative, and relatively quiet. However, the court gained a
Democratic majority in 1978 that grew to a 6-1 majority by
1982. Democratic associate justice Frank Celebrezze won the
position of chief justice in 1978 and continued in that position
16 Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 2503.01 (Anderson 1988).
,1 The legal provisions for Ohio judicial elections are contained in Omo CONST., art.
IV, § 6; OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 2503.01-.03, 3505.04, 3513.13 (Anderson 1988). For
historical background on the Ohio system, see Aumann, The Selection, Tenure, Retirement
and Compensation of Judges in Ohio, 5 U. CN. L. REa. 408 (1931).
,S On the roles of parties and partisanship in Ohio supreme court elections, see P.
Duaois, FRoM BALLOT TO BENCH, supra note 2, at 81-84; Barber, Judicial Politics in Ohio,
in Govwamrr AND Pouncs iN Omo 89-133 (C. Lieberman ed. 1984); Barber, supra note
2; Baum, supra note 2.
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through 1986. During the 1980s, the court and Celebrezze in-
creasingly became subjects of attention and controversy.' 9
One source of attention was a shift in the court's position
on economic issues. Prior to the 1980s, the Ohio Supreme Court
participated in the nationwide movement toward tort doctrines
more favorable to injured parties, but on the whole it was
conservative on issues pitting businesses against consumers and
workers. In contrast, the Celebrezze court adopted more liberal
doctrines on such issues, particularly in tort law. 20 This shift
won the approval of the labor movement and other liberal
groups but displeased insurance companies, other business groups,
and the medical community.
More important as a source of public controversy was Chief
Justice Celebrezze. After his short-lived candidacy for governor
in 1982, the state bar association investigated Celebrezze for
possible ethical violations involving electioneering for a non-
judicial office while he served as chief justice. The investigation
led to a bitter, well publicized feud between the chief justice and
the Ohio bar association, in which the state's news media fre-
quently portrayed Celebrezze as acting vindictively to punish the
bar association. Media reports also described Celebrezze's battles
with Republicans on the Court, as well as his efforts to consol-
idate his power within the court system.2
In 1984 two Democrats lost contests for the Ohio supreme
court. One of the candidates was an incumbent and also
11 A. TARR & M. PORTER, STATE SUPRE COURTS IN STATE AND NATION at ch. 4
(1988); Cook & West, Ohio's Lawyers Ask: Is This Any Way to Run the Supreme Court?
Frank Celebrezze Answers: Damn Right!, CoxUmaus MoNTnY 50-56, 121-24 (July 1983);
O'Connor, The Siege of Fort Celebrezze, Cirv. MAo. 81-83, 112-19 (September 1986).
See, e.g., Shroades v. Rental Homes, Inc., 427 N.E.2d 774 (Ohio 1981); Albritton
v. Neighborhood Centers, 466 N.E.2d 867 (Ohio 1984); Blankenship v. Cincinnati Milacron
Chem., Inc., 433 N.E.2d 572 (Ohio 1982). A more extensive discussion of cases is found
in A. TARR & M. PORTER, supra note 19, at 128-30. Unlike several other state supreme
courts in the 1980s, however, the Ohio court did not take liberal positions on civil liberties
issues. See A. TARR & M. PORTER, supra note 19, at 154-68.
21 Cook & West, supra note 19; O'Connor, supra note 19; Poldomani, The Little
War in Ohio's Top Court, Akron Beacon Journal, Jan. 5, 1986, at Al, A10, All;
Poldomani, A Judge Seeks His Day in Court, Akron Beacon Journal, Nov. 25, 1984, at
Al, A6; Sharkey & Ricks, Frank Celebrezze: A Law Unto Himself, Cleveland Plain Dealer,
Apr. 22, 1984, at I-A, 20-A, 21-A; Kimrnins, Policy Reveals Celebrezze-Bar Feud, Col-
umbus Citizen-Journal, June 4, 1982, at 15.
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Celebrezze's brother. The primary reason for these defeats prob-
ably was the negative publicity about the chief justice, which
reflected on other Democratic justices-particularly one closely
related to the chief justice-and on the party's candidates for
the court.22 These losses reduced the Democratic majority from
6-1 to 4-3. With three contested seats in 1986, one being the
chief justice's position and another being an associate's seat held
by a Democrat, the Republicans had an opportunity both to win
a majority and to replace Celebrezze. Both political parties and
an array of interest groups worked hard in support of candi-
dates. The mass media paid considerable attention to the con-
tests.
Chief Justice Celebrezze was opposed for re-election by Re-
publican Thomas Moyer, a member of the state court of appeals
in Columbus. Moyer was not well known when the campaign
began, but he benefited a great deal from helpful media atten-
tion, much of it critical of Celebrezze. In mid-October, news-
papers gave considerable space to charges (originally made in
the Cleveland Plain Dealer) that the chief justice had taken
campaign contributions from two labor union locals allegedly
influenced by organized crime.23 The newspapers also publicized
other charges against Celebrezze. Ultimately, every large-city
newspaper endorsed Moyer. 24 The candidates spent a record
amount of money for an Ohio judicial race; about $1.7 million
was spent by Celebrezze and $1 million by Moyer .2  Conse-
2 Baum, supra note 2.
23 Webb, Mob-Linked Groups Donate to Chief Justice, Cleveland Plain Dealer, Oct.
12, 1986, at 1-A, 6-A; see also A Full-Scale Investigation of Ohio's Chief Justice, Akron
Beacon Journal, Oct. 18, 1986, at A4; The Chief and Tainted Money, Toledo Blade, Oct.
14, 1986, at 10.
' See The Chief and Tainted Money, supra note 23; The Ohio Court Problem,
Akron Beacon Journal, Oct. 12, 1986, at E2; High Court Too Politicized; Elect Tom
Moyer as Chief, Dayton Daily News and Journal Herald, Oct. 12, 1986, at 10-B; Moyer
for Chief Justice, Columbus Dispatch, Oct. 5, 1986, at 2C. At least three major newspapers
also had endorsed an opponent of Celebrezze in the May primary election. See Beacon
Journal Recommendations, Akron Beacon Journal, May 4, 1986, at E2; For Ohio Supreme
Court Remember Stern, Brown, Dayton Daily News, May 4, 1986, at 10-B; Recommen-
dations for Tuesday, Cleveland Plain Dealer, May 4, 1986, at 4-C.
1 These and other data on spending in contests for state offices are taken from
Curtin & Lowe, Celeste Spent Twice as Much as Rhodes in Race, Columbus Dispatch,
Dec. 13, 1986, at 1B, 5B.
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quently, the television commercial time used by the candidates
almost surely set a record as well.
In one contest for associate justice, the candidates were
Republican incumbent Robert Holmes and Cleveland trial judge
Francis Sweeney. Sweeney is a name associated with the Ohio
Democratic party, and another Democrat named Sweeney (A.
William Sweeney) was sitting on the supreme court at the time
of the election. In the other court contest, no incumbent was
running. The Democratic candidate was Columbus attorney Her-
bert Brown; the Republican candidate was Akron court of ap-
peals judge Joyce George. Brown is a very common name for
Ohio candidates, especially judicial candidates; in 1981 three
justices named Brown sat on the supreme court. The name has
been identified with both political parties, though in recent years
candidates for state office named Brown generally have been
Democrats.
These two associate justice contests received more than av-
erage media coverage for an Ohio supreme court race, but to a
great extent they were submerged in the race for chief justice.
Spending was fairly high by historical standards, although it was
at a much lower level than in the Celebrezze-Moyer race. 26
Sweeney spent $278,000; Holmes spent $187,000; Brown spent
$179,000; George spent $150,000. The state's major newspapers
endorsed the Republican candidates in both contests along with.
Moyer for chief justice.27
Moyer won his race against Celebrezze with 54.57o of the
vote, while the two contests for associate justice were quite close.
Republican incumbent Holmes defeated Sweeney with 50.6% of
the vote, while Democrat Brown, with 50.40,28 defeated George.
In the 1986 election, Ohio voters also chose a set of state
executive officials and a United States senator. The gubernatorial
race matched incumbent Democrat Richard Celeste against for-
Curtin & Lowe, supra note 25, at IB, 5B.
See Joyce George for Justice and Robert Holmes for Justice, Akron Beacon
Journal, Oct. 12, 1986, at E2; Keep Robert Holmes on Court and And Add Judge Joyce
George, Dayton Daily News and Journal Herald, Oct. 12, 1986, at 10-B; and Holmes,
George Choices, Columbus Dispatch, Oct. 5, 1986, at 2C.
1 These and other election results are taken from S. BROWN, Omo ELECTION STA-
TIsTCS (1987).
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mer governor James Rhodes. Both candidates had enjoyed long
careers in Ohio politics. The contest was heated and well pub-
licized, though Rhodes' fading fortunes during the campaign
limited his ability to raise money and probably reduced media
attention in the late stages of the race. Altogether, Celeste spent
$5.9 million while Rhodes spent $2.9 million. 29 Celeste won
easily, capturing 60.6% of the vote.
The senatorial contest pitted incumbent Democrat John Glenn
against Thomas Kindness, a member of the U.S. House of
Representatives. Because of his many years of political activity
in Ohio and his prior career as an astronaut, Glenn was highly
visible. Kindness was a long-time member of the House, but he
had not attracted statewide publicity during his career. Because
of the assumption that Glenn would win easily, the media cov-
ered the Senate race less intensively than they covered the gu-
bernatorial race. This assumption also limited spending by the
two candidates, neither of whom ranked among the top fifty
Senate candidates in spending in 1986.30 Glenn won the race
with 62.5% of the vote.
Four other Democrats holding statewide office ran for re-
election against opponents who were not well known on a state-
wide level at the beginning of the campaign. Each incumbent
won in November by a large margin. The closest contest was
between Treasurer Mary Ellen Withrow and challenger Jeff Ja-
cobs; Withrow received 55% of the vote. Withrow was a first-
term incumbent who had received a limited amount of publicity
during her time in office. Jacobs was a first-term state legislator,
largely unknown in the state prior to the campaign. Jacobs spent
a little under $1.5 million, nearly twice the total spending of the
three Republicans who challenged Democratic incumbents for
attorney general, auditor, and secretary of state; Withrow spent
$769,000. The total spending for the two candidates was about
$500,000 less than in the contest for chief justice, but more than
four times as much as the total in either of the races for associate
justice. The level of media coverage was relatively limited, though
the closeness of the race attracted some attention.
2Curtin & Lowe, supra note 25, at 1B, 5B.
-0 Gaunt, Hill Campaign Spending Hits AIl-7ime High, 45 CONG. Q. Wmy REP.
991 (1987).
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In the fall of 1986 the Polimetrics Laboratory of the Ohio
State University Department of Political Science conducted a
three-wave telephone survey of Ohio adults focusing on November
contests for six offices: governor, senator, treasurer, and the three
supreme court races. Information on candidates and the outcomes
in those six races is summarized in Table 1. Respondents were
selected through a random sampling procedure. The first two
waves of the survey were conducted prior to the election, during
the period from September 29 to October 8 and the period from
October 23 to November 3. Approximately 500 respondents were
interviewed in each survey. The post-election wave was conducted
November 6-21; approximately 800 of the 1000 respondents to
the two pre-election waves were reinterviewed. Thus, the study
incorporated a partial panel design. The post-election survey was
less extensive than the two pre-election waves.
Table 1
Summary Information on 1986 Electoral Contests
Included in the Study
Democratic Republican Winner & % of
Office Candidate Candidate Vote Obtained
Governor Richard Celeste* James Rhodes Celeste 60.6
Senate John Glenn* Thomas Kindness Glenn 62.5
Treasurer Mary Ellen Withrow* Jeff Jacobs Withrow 55.0
Chief Justice Frank Celebrezze* Thomas Moyer Moyer 54.5
Assoc. Justice 1 Francis Sweeney Robert Holmes* Holmes 50.6
Assoc. Justice 2 Herbert Brown Joyce George Brown 50.4
* Incumbent
The surveys enabled comparisons among supreme court con-
tests that varied considerably in the volume of information pro-
vided to voters and comparisons between those contests and non-
judicial contests with similar variation. The survey questions dealt
with a number of matters related to those contests. Voter infor-
mation was not a central focus of the surveys, but several items
tapped aspects of respondents' information levels. The responses
to those items provide a partial but considerable sense of what
voters knew when they made choices in each contest.
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III. FiNDINGS
The survey items that concern voters' information are of
several types, and they have been placed in four categories. Each
category will be examined in turn, with primary attention to
comparisons among the six contests.
To assess information levels of voters, one might examine
responses given by all survey respondents. But it is more appro-
priate to focus on those who reported that they actually voted in
the various electoral contests in 1986, because the article's concern
is with the information levels of people who participate in the
electoral decision. Accordingly, analysis will be restricted to the
subsamples of varying sizes who reported voting in each race.3 1
A. Sources of Information
Voters might obtain information about the candidates and
contests from a variety of sources, but the mass media are likely
to be the most important sources. The medium that provided the
most extensive information was probably the daily newspapers.
About 80 percent of the voters claimed to have read about the
campaigns in the newspaper. However, answers to the question
of whether respondents had read about the campaigns in the
newspaper provide only a very general sense of how much people
"1 As generally is the case with surveys, identification of respondents who actually
voted is problematical. For the three non-judicial contests, the proportion of respondents
in the post-election survey who reported that they had cast votes was substantially higher
than the proportion of actual voters in the adult population, based on Census Bureau
estimates of the number of eligible voters in U.S. DP'T OF COMMERCE, STA=~nCAL
AESTRAcT OF THE UNrrED STATEs 1988 (1987), at 251; the differences were approximately
20 percent in each contest. A similar difference occurred in the race for chief justice. Such
overreports of voting are common. See Clausen, Response Validity: Vote Report, 32 PuB.
OPINION Q. 588 (1968).
The contests for associate justice positions followed a different pattern; the propor-
tions differed only by about 10 percent in those two contests. If respondents who did not
recall the candidate for whom they had voted are excluded, there is essentially no difference.
The differences that do appear may reflect both inaccurate reports by respondents and
characteristics of the sampling procedure that favored the selection of people more likely
than the average person to vote. In some judicial contests, survey respondents actually
have underreported their rate of voting. See Adamany & Shelley, Encore! The Forgetful
Voter, 44 PuB. OPM'ON Q. 234 (1980). Because the direction of the vote frequently is
important for analysis of the data, analysis will be restricted to respondents who claimed
to have voted and could identify the candidate for whom they had voted.
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learned about the candidates from reading the paper. More im-
portant, the question does not allow for differentiation among
the various contests. 32
In the pre-election surveys, respondents were asked whether
they had seen television commercials for each of the candidates.
The accuracy with which most voters recalled seeing commercials
for specific candidates probably was quite imperfect; undoubtedly,
their responses reflected their recognition of the candidates' names
and their usage of other sources of information in addition to
their viewing of commercials. Thus, the responses can be inter-
preted in two ways, both as a gauge of commercials as a source
of voter information and, more generally, as a gauge of voters'
familiarity with the candidates.
Because the preponderance of commercials were shown after
Table 2
Proportions of Voters Who Reported Seeing Television








Chief Justice Celebreeze 85.7
Moyer 34.8
Assoc. Justice 1 Sweeney 22.8
Holmes 16.3
Assoc. Justice 2 Brown 16.9
George 16.2
*Voters who responded "don't know" are treated as having reported that they
did not see ads.
11 Because different sets of respondents voted in different contests, this item might
differentiate among contests. For instance, it is possible that the smaller subsets who voted
in the associate justice races would be more likely to pay attention to campaign information
in the newspaper. In fact, however, there were no meaningful differences among the races
in this respect.
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the first survey wave was conducted, attention should be focused
on responses obtained in the second survey wave. Those responses
are summarized in Table 2. As the table indicates, the two contests
for associate justice differed from the other four contests. Voters
were substantially more likely to recall commercials for the two
candidates for treasurer than those publicizing either candidate in
the two associate justice races. Chief Justice Celebrezze, however,
ranked second only to Celeste in the proportion of voters who
recalled his commercials. His opponent Moyer ranked much lower,
but the proportion of voters recalling a Moyer commercial was
almost as great as that for treasurer candidate Jeff Jacobs.
B. Assessment of Information
For three of the six contests, respondents were asked whether
they felt that enough information had been available for them
to make their choices. This question, of course, is highly sub-
jective. Yet, it allows a comparison of contests in terms of the
volume of information that voters felt they had obtained. The
results are shown in Table 3. As expected, satisfaction with the
information available increased between waves. Further, the lower
the original level of satisfaction, the greater the increase.
Table 3
Proportion of Voters Reporting That Sufficient
Information on Racers Was Available*
Office 1st Wave 2nd Wave Combined
Governor 59.3 65.4 62.4
Chief Justice 40.0 50.8 45.6
Treasurer 29.6 51.3 40.8
*Voters who responded "don't know" are excluded.
Not surprisingly, a higher percentage of voters expressed
satisfaction with the available information in the gubernatorial
contest than in the other two contests. The difference, however,
is not as great as one might have expected. More striking is the
fact that by the time of the second survey wave the proportion
for the treasurer's race had nearly caught up with the proportion
[Vol. 77
1988-89] VOTERS INFORMATION IN JuDiciu ELECTIONS 661
in the race for chief justice. Though the contest for treasurer
attracted relatively little media attention, its closeness in com-
parison with the other non-judicial races increased interest and
coverage toward the end of the campaign. Still, the voters'
responses are surprising in that the opportunity to learn about
the race for chief justice seemingly was better than for the
treasurer's race. It is possible that voters had a higher standard
of information for the chief justice contest because they per-
ceived it as more consequential; even so, the lack of a difference
is noteworthy. Most likely, had the same question been asked
regarding the associate justice contests, the proportion of res-
pondents satisfied with the available information would have
been far lower.
C. Direct Evidence of Information Levels
Two sets of survey items directly tapped voters' knowledge
of the candidates. The first set includes the pre-election questions
about voting intentions in the contests for governor and chief
justice. In each instance, interviewers first asked the question
without providing the candidates' names and then provided those
names as a prompt if necessary. This format allows a measure
of recall of candidates' names.
Restricting analysis to respondents who ultimately voted and
who had a candidate preference in the pre-election waves, the
results for the two offices differ sharply. In the two survey waves
combined, 69% of the voters in the gubernatorial race provided
their candidate preference without a prompt; in the race for chief
justice, 17% did so. The two survey waves produced similar results,
though the differences between the contests were somewhat sharper
in the second wave (75% to 18%). This finding suggests that, even
in a highly publicized judicial contest, voter familiarity with the
judicial candidates was far more limited than voter familiarity with
the gubernatorial candidates. The long-time public careers of Ce-
leste and Rhodes, and the heavy attention that they had received
for years, help to account for this difference. The difference be-
tween the gubernatorial race and the contest for treasurer might
have been even greater. Still, the low rate of name recall for chief
justice is a significant finding.
The second set of items that tested voters' knowledge con-
cerns recollection of the candidates' party affiliations. Respon-
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dents in the pre-election survey waves were asked if they recalled
the party of the judicial candidates for whom they intended to
vote. They also were asked the party affiliation of each candidate
for whom they intended to vote in the races for the three non-
judicial offices. The results are shown in Table 4.33
Table 4
Voters' Recall of the Political Party Affiliation of
the Candidate For Whom They Intended to Vote,


































































































*Because of low reported turnout and late voting decisions, the numbers of
respondents who had a preference in the pre-election waves and who voted in
the associate justice contests are low: below 100 for each of the four candidates,
and below 50 for George and Holmes.
31 Included in the results in Table 4 are only those respondents who ultimately voted
in each contest and only their responses concerning the candidates for whom they said
they would vote.
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As the table indicates, awareness of party affiliations differed
considerably among contests. Since Celeste and Rhodes both
were well known and strongly identified with their parties, it is
not surprising that the gubernatorial candidates ranked first. The
high name recognition of Glenn and Celebrezze helped to place
their contests second and third respectively. Perhaps most strik-
ing is the fourth rank of the Sweeney-Holmes contest, which
undoubtedly reflects Holmes' incumbency status and Sweeney's
Democratic-identified name. Findings for this contest and for
the George-Brown contest must be interpreted with caution,
however, for two reasons. First, only a small number of respon-
dents met the criteria for inclusion in Table 4 for these two
contests. Second, it is likely that those voters who had reached
a decision relatively early in these contests were more knowl-
edgeable than the large proportion of respondents who reached
decisions later.
Notably, the treasurer's race stood considerably lower in
voter knowledge of party labels. Voters correctly identified the
affiliations of both candidates in that race less often than they
did for the judicial candidates. But the George-Brown contest
had by far the lowest level of party recognition, in that voters
favoring each candidate did only slightly better than chance in
identifying each candidate's party. This result probably reflects
two conditions: neither candidate was well known, and the Brown
name-though common in Ohio politics-is not clearly identified
with either political party.
The results are somewhat ambiguous. Further, the relevance
of voters' knowledge of party affiliations in judicial contests is
subject to debate. But it is noteworthy that the affiliations of
candidates in two officially nonpartisan judicial contests were
better known than those of the candidates (one of them an
incumbent) in another statewide race. In this sense, voter infor-
mation about the judicial contests seems fairly high.
D. Indirect Evidence of Information Levels
Some of the survey items that did not directly tap voters'
information provide indirect evidence about the ,amount of in-
formation that voters held. The most useful of these items are
two sets that deal explicitly with attitudes rather than knowledge.
The first is the "feeling thermometer," commonly used in
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election surveys. Respondents are asked to place their feelings
about candidates on a scale from 0 (highly negative) to 100
(highly positive), with 50 representing a neutral feeling. They
also are allowed to indicate whether they are unfamiliar with a
candidate or feel unable to rate the candidate.
For purposes of this article, the direction of voters' feelings
about the candidates is irrelevant. Rather, the concern is with
what the responses indicate about voters' knowledge of the
candidates. The highest level of knowledge is suggested by a
willingness to rate a candidate and a rating higher or lower than
50. A rating of 50, which respondents often provide, suggests a
somewhat lower level of knowledge. Neutrality is likely to reflect
insufficient familiarity with a candidate to make a positive or
negative judgment. An inability or unwillingness to offer any
rating suggests the lowest level of knowledge.
In each wave of the 1986 survey, respondents were asked to
offer feeling thermometer ratings of the candidates in the six
races studied. Table 5 presents voters' responses in the post-
election survey wave, the wave that best captures what voters
knew when they went to the polls.
Based on the proportion of voters in each category, the
candidates basically fall into three groups. The first, about whom
voters seemed to know the most, includes the two gubernatorial
candidates as well as Glenn and Celebrezze. In the second group
are Withrow (well ahead of the others in the group), Kindness,
and two judicial candidates, Sweeney and Moyer. The final
group includes Jacobs and the remaining three judicial candi-
dates.
The average judicial candidate fared less well than the av-
erage candidate for executive office. Rather striking was the
relative infrequency of ratings for Holmes, who had served on
the supreme court for seven years. Further, Brown ranked quite
low even though some voters undoubtedly made mistaken ratings
for him based on their knowledge of other politicians with the
same last name.
Yet Celebrezze achieved a level of familiarity by this measure
that was only slightly lower than that of the incumbent governor
and senator and comparable with that of James Rhodes, a four-
term former governor. The mean proportion of voters who gave
non-neutral ratings to the judicial candidates was only slightly
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Table 5
Feeling Thermometer Ratings of Candidates by Voters,
Post-Election Wave
Office and Rating Other Rating
Candidate Than 50 of 50 No Rating
Governor
Celeste 87.7% 9.7% 2.5%
Rhodes 79.2 18.6 2.1
Senate
Glenn 86.9 11.3 1.9
Kindness 56.7 18.8 24.6
Treasurer
Withrow 68.6 15.5 15.9
Jacobs 37.6 22.6 39.9
Chief Justice
Celebrezze 81.5 13.7 4.8
Moyer 53.5 19.7 26.9
Assoc. Justice 1
Sweeney 51.3 23.9 24.8
Holmes 32.9 22.6 44.4
Assoc. Justice 2
Brown 36.0 29.8 34.2
George 41.9 23.5 34.6
lower than the mean proportion for the two candidates for
treasurer, the most comparable non-judicial office in the level
of media publicity. From this perspective, the judicial candidates
did not stand out for their obscurity.
Another indicator of voters' knowledge is the approval rat-
ings given to incumbents running for re-election. In the pre-
election surveys, respondents were asked to assess the perform-
ance in office of Governor Celeste, Chief Justice Celebrezze,
and Justice Holmes. Respondents were dichotomized according
to whether they were willing to make an assessment. The results
are shown in Table 6.
The ordering of the incumbents is as we would expect. The
great majority of voters rated Celeste, about half rated Cele-
brezze, and only a small minority rated Holmes. The proportion
for Celebrezze is higher than might have been predicted, and it
suggests fairly widespread awareness of his activity on the su-
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Table 6
Proportion of Voters Making Evaluation
of Incumbent Performance*
Incumbent First Wave Second Wave Combined
Celeste 84.7 85.1 84.9
Celebrezze 52.4 48.3 50.4
Holmes 11.2 6.4 8.6
*Voters who
tion.
responded "don't know" are counted as not making an evalua-
preme court. It is unfortunate that no comparison with Withrow
as treasurer is possible. Based on responses to other items,
particularly the feeling thermometer queries, it seems likely that
she would rank somewhere between Celebrezze and Holmes.
The final indirect indicator of information is the time of the
voting decision. In the contest for governor and the Sweeney-
Holmes race for associate justice, voters were asked when they
had made their decision in the contests. The comparison is not
an ideal one, since the gubernatorial race matched the two
candidates best known prior to the contest, while the two asso-
ciate races were much less visible than the contest for chief
justice. Still the results, shown in Table 7, are of some interest.
Table 7
Voters' Reports of the Time of Their Voting Decision
Time Governor Assoc. Justice 1*
Before primaries 48.7% 8.9%
Just after primaries 16.3 4.9
1-2 months before general 12.7 8.0
Within 2 weeks of general 3.2 9.8
1 week or less before general 12.0 33.0
On election day 7.1 35.3
100.0 100.0
*Contest between Sweeney and Holmes.
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The pattern is not surprising. Most voters recalled that they
chose between gubernatorial candidates Rhodes and Celeste quite
early in the election process. In contrast, two-thirds of the voters
chose between associate justice candidates Holmes and Sweeney
within the last week of the campaign, and one-third made their
choice on election day. Had the Holmes-Sweeney contest been
highly publicized, the late decision times could reflect the diffi-
culty of reaching a decision in the face of conflicting informa-
tion. Given the reality-that information on the race was fairly
scarce-the results suggest that most voters could not pick a
candidate until very late because they had a limited information
basis for making a choice. Despite the absence of a more mean-
ingful non-judicial comparison, the responses do not suggest
that voters in this contest generally made highly informed choices.
CONCLUSION
For reasons suggested earlier in this article, the findings do
not lead to firm conclusions about the extent of voters' knowl-
edge in the six 1986 contests that were part of the study. Gen-
eralizations from those contests to other elections are even more
difficult. But the findings do allow some very tentative conclu-
sions.
First, the various measures of information that were exam-
ined differentiated among contests, and the measures did so in
fairly consistent ways. The findings seem to indicate that the
electorate approached some candidate choices with considerably
more information than they brought to others.
In this respect, there is not a sharp distinction between
judicial and non-judicial contests. By the measures of informa-
tion that were used, the race for chief justice ranked fairly high,
closer to those for governor and senator than to the other two
supreme court contests. Voters seemed to know more about the
candidates for chief justice than about the candidates for treas-
urer.
Differences in voters' information levels correlated rather
well with differences in the volume of information that was
provided to them. Prior to and during the campaigns, Ohioans
were told a great deal about the candidates for governor, for
the Senate, and for chief justice. They were told much less about
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the candidates for treasurer and for associate justice. It is hardly
surprising that voters seemed to know more about the first three
contests than about the latter three.
For the debate over voters' qualifications to choose judges,
the distinction between the races for chief justice and for asso-
ciate justice is important. There is some reason to be impressed
with the level of knowledge that voters seemed to possess in the
Celebrezze-Moyer contest, but there is little cause for satisfaction
about the contests for associate justice. In those races, even
Ohioans who chose to vote seemed to do so with a considerable
lack of knowledge about the candidates.
In this sense, the results provide some ammunition for op-
ponents of judicial elections. Opponents could point to the race
for chief justice as highly exceptional, one that involved a level
of publicity unprecedented in Ohio. The more limited informa-
tion that voters in the other supreme court contests possessed
would seem far more typical. In less controversial supreme court
times and in most lower court races the information levels might
be even lower.
Yet, the existence of low information levels among voters
does not necessarily mean that the electorate is making mean-
ingless choices in judicial contests. As suggested earlier, even
those who possess only a sliver of information regarding a
contest may be making a meaningful choice if that information
is relevant. More important, a minority of voters who are well
informed may hold the balance in a contest, so that the final
outcome has a solid basis. There is some evidence that this was
the case in two races for associate justice in Ohio in 1984.34 In
light of the closeness of the races, it may well be true of the
associate justice contests in 1986.
In Ohio and many other states, it is likely that judges will
continue to be selected through elections for many years to come.
Indeed, Ohio voters rejected a Missouri Plan proposal by a 2-1
margin in 1987. 35 Because of this reality, it seems appropriate to
', Baum, supra note 2.
' Poldomani, Merit Selection Doomed at Start, Akron Beacon Journal, Nov. 8,
1987, at Al, A6; Lowe, Ohio Votes Down Merit Selection of Judges, Columbus Dis-
patch, Nov. 4, 1987, at IA. In 1938 Ohio voters rejected a ballot measure for the
Missouri Plan by a similar margin; since their action predated Missouri's adoption of
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look for ways to enhance the level of information available to
voters in judicial contests. Some of the events that brought
attention to the 1986 contest for Ohio chief justice may have
been unfortunate for the judicial system, but they helped to
produce a more informed electorate.3 6 Certainly the quality of
voters' decisions in judicial contests would be improved if the
relatively massive publicity that surrounded the Celebrezze-Moyer
race were to be duplicated in other races.
But achievement of this goal would not be easy. One useful
step would be for the state to provide to the voters pamphlets
that include information about the candidates. This source seems
to have some impact in California trial court contests.37 But this
step alone probably would have only a marginal effect; the key
is media coverage. Yet, the news media cannot be expected to
make fundamental changes in their practices concerning coverage
of electoral contests below the highest level offices.
Ironically, the mechanisms that seem most likely to increase
voters' information in contests for judgeships take forms that
opponents of judicial elections find unpalatable. Large-scale
campaigns by candidates raise concern about the sources of the
money that facilitates such campaigns. 8 From some perspectives,
party-oriented and issue-oriented campaigns may be the most
effective in informing voters. But supporters of the Missouri
Plan often argue that both political parties and issues should be
irrelevant, and-as noted earlier-explicit campaigning on the
basis of policy issues is generally interpreted as a violation of
ethical rules for judicial candidates. 39
that system by two years, a positive vote might have given it the designation of the
"Ohio Plan." On the 1938 vote, see Barkdull, Analysis of Ohio Vote on Appointive
Judiciary, 22 J. AM. JUDICATURE Soc'Y 197 (1939).
36 The media, of course, do not serve simply to inform voters; the kinds of
information that they provide may favor one candidate over the other. Certainly the
major newspapers in Ohio helped Thomas Moyer to defeat Frank Celebrezze by pre-
senting information that tended to favor Moyer. How one evaluates that coverage would
depend considerably on one's view of the two candidates' merits.
1, Dubois, Voting Cues, supra note 1, at 410-11, 419.
11 An example is the funding of campaigns for the Texas Supreme Court. See
Hight, Firms in Texaco Case Funded Eight Justices, Austin American-Statesman, Feb.
26, 1987, at Al, A16; and Adler, The Texas Bench: Anything Goes, THE Am icAcN
LAWYER, April 1986, at 1, 11-14. Discussions of the problems that may result from
campaign contributions are found in the sources cited in note 40, infra.
19 See supra note 12.
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A second irony is that these developments are actually oc-
curring. The level of spending in judicial election contests has
grown substantially in some states. 40 Ethical restrictions on issue-
oriented appeals to the voters are being flouted with increasing
frequency.41 Whether or not we approve of the kinds of infor-
mation that voters are given and the ways that candidates gain
the resources to present information, the informational base for
voting decisions in races for judgeships may be growing margin-
ally. It remains to be seen how far this trend will continue and
how much impact it ultimately will have on voters' information
levels.
The data provided in this article add only modestly to the
understanding of the realities of elections for judicial offices.
More important, the inquiry that has been undertaken here
should underline the need to examine empirically, rather than in
the abstract, judicial elections and other selection systems for
judges. In the debate over alternative formal selection systems,
many of the participants rely on scattered information or even
on assumptions about the actual operation of these systems,
Systematic empirical investigation is essential to making mean-
ingful judgments about the strengths and weaknesses of each
system. Such investigation also can help in identifying means to
improve the systems that currently exist in each state.
40 Kaplan, Justice for Sale, 13 COMMON CAUSE MAO. 29 (1987); Schotland, Elective
Judges' Campaign Financing: Are State Judges' Robes the Emperor's Clothes of Amer-
ican Democracy?, 2 J. OF LAW & POL. 57,'58-66, 96-120 (1985).
41 Most commonly, candidates portray themselves as conservative on criminal
justice issues, particularly the death penalty, often in comparison with their opponents.
See, e.g., Elect Edward C. Weber, Akron Beacon Journal, Nov. 2, 1987, at A5 (adver-
tisement for Ohio municipal court candidate); John Dixon Doesn't Think 20 Stab
Wounds Are Enough, Shreveport Journal, Sept. 20, 1984, at 11A (advertisement for
Louisiana supreme court candidate). This trend is discussed in Schotland, supra note
40, at 79-81; Tell & Winer, Soft Justice: The Hard Facts, NAT'L L.J., Jan. 5, 1981, at
1, 10, 11.
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